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UTILITARIANISM REFORMED 
L. W. Sumner* 
UTILITARIANISM AND CO-OPERATION. By .Donald H. Regan. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 1980. Pp. xiv, 279. Cloth 
$37.50; paper $15.95. 
In 1780, the first edition was printed of Jeremy Bentham's Intro-
duction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, the earliest mod-
em statement of the moral theory that has come to be known as 
utilitarianism.1 Despite the vicissitudes of philosophical fashion 
since Bentham's time, the theory has seldom relinquished its position 
as the centerpiece of Anglo-American moral, political, and legal phi-
losophy. The issues that have animated the enormous literature on 
utilitarianism may be broadly grouped into two categories: the ex-
ternal and the internal. The former concerns the relations between 
utilitarianism and rival theories, or between utilitarianism and 
"common sense." The critical question here is the adequacy of the 
theory as a general guide to individual moral decision, social choice, 
and the construction of political and legal institutions. This external 
debate has been paralleled by an equally vigorous intratheoretical 
inquiry carried on within the utilitarian camp itself. The critical is-
sue here is the comparative assessment of the various versions of the 
theory. Utilitarianism, like most political and religious ideologies, 
appears to be a single unified doctrine only from afar. It is, in fact, a 
family of theories loosely linked by a shared set of basic presupposi-
tions. The internal debate concerning the relative merits of the 
many possible members of this family has not been entirely insu-
lated from the external one, for some versions of the theory have 
been devised and defended for their supposed ability to surmount 
what have been felt to be formidable substantive difficulties. But 
much of the discussion has assumed the adequacy of a generally util-
• Professor of Philosophy, University of Toronto. B.A. 1962, University of Toronto; M.A. 
1964, Ph.D. 1965, Princeton University. The author has recently published a book on Abortion 
and Moral Theory (1981). - Ed. 
I. Actual publication was delayed until 1789 owing, Bentham tells us, to his discovery of 
some unexpected metaphysical difficulties. His attempt to resolve them led to the composition 
of Of Laws in General. See J. BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970) (the 
manuscript was first published in 1945 under the title The Limits of Jurisprudence JJtjined). 
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itarian approach and has been directed toward identifying the vari-
ant that best meets the theory's own standards. 
The internal issues then subdivide into two categories. The .first 
concerns the content of the theory: What determines the value of an 
action's consequences? The second concerns the theory's form: 
What is the connection between the moral properties of an action 
and the value of its consequences? Even a limited number of plausi-
ble options concerning each of these elements will combine to gener-
ate a sizable variety of theories, each of which may reasonably be 
represented as utilitarian. 
Donald H. Regan's Utilitarianism and Co-operation, published 
exactly two hundred years after the printing of Bentham's pioneering 
work, provides fresh evidence that the theory's resources have not 
yet been exhausted. The book falls nicely into the second subdivi-
sion of the internal debate. Regan does not try to defend utilitarian-
ism against rival approaches; nor does he tell us what to count as 
utility. He attempts instead to assess the relative merits, from a utili-
tarian point of view, of some of the theory's traditional forms: act-
utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism, and utilitarian generalization. 
Regan's arguments and conclusions are important, and I will re-
turn to them shortly. First, however, I have some cautions for poten-
tial readers. Despite Regan's academic post at the University of 
Michigan Law School, the book contains no legal theory whatsoever. 
Regan con.fines himself to utilitarianism as a moral theory and ig-
nores its political and legal implications. The discussion is, more-
over, highly theoretical. Regan is concerned with practical moral 
problems only to the extent necessary to expose the strengths and 
weaknes~es of possible versions of the theory. Most of the cases that 
he uses to test the theory's traditional varieties are themselves highly 
formal. Although he pays some attention to real-life examples illus-
trating the various theories, he never carries the analysis past the 
point where the desired theoretical conclusions have emerged. This 
avoidance of both political-legal and practical-moral issues means 
that the book will interest only moral philosophers. 
Beyond this initial narrowing of the potential audience lie some 
further barriers. The questions that Regan addresses are extremely 
intricate, and an adequate treatment of them cannot fail to be itself 
intricate. Even the professional philosopher will .find the book dense 
and difficult. This is not necessarily a defect. Indeed, Regan has 
done his best to mitigate the reader's inevitable labors in persevering 
through the argument. The main track of his argument is not hard 
to follow if one passes by the side trails that are now and again ex-
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plored. The book begins with a map of the route and signposts are 
located at frequent intervals. Complications and digressions are 
clearly labeled and often segregated from the central argument. Fi-
nally, not the least of the book's virtues is that the author has con-
fined technical vocabulary to the minimum necessary for efficient 
deployment of the argument, and he writes in plain and accessible 
English. In short, as many concessions have been made to the reader 
as are compatible with analytic rigor. But the issues remain com-
plex, and their exploration forbidding. 
Moreover, many moral philosophers, who are, after all, trained 
to read hard books in their subject, will find the issues unfamiliar. In 
the past two decades, the literature on the varieties of utilitarianism 
has undergone a dramatic population explosion. The debate that 
Regan has joined has an extensive history, and an understanding of· 
his contribution is aided considerably by familiarity with that his-
tory. Even though Regan has done much to explain the issues to the 
uninitiated, a reader's lack of background will be an added liability 
that he will need to surmount. 
Before the book's potential audience shrinks to the vanishing 
point, let me provide some incentives for tackling this book. The 
literature on this subject, as on most, consists of a very large number 
of minor pieces and a very small number of landmark works. The 
two principal landmarks to date have been David Lyons's Forms 
and Limits of Utilitarianism2 and D.H. Hodgson's Consequences of 
Utilitarianism.3 Now there is a third. (It is an interesting sidelight 
that all three books began life as doctoral dissertations; apparently 
this is the sort of work of which one is capable only during one's 
graduate studies.) Regan's book has raised the state of the art to a 
new level. It is rigorous, lucid, comprehensive, and original. It il-
luminates virtually every issue it addresses, including those that it 
shares with Lyons and Hodgson. A later landmark, of course, profits 
from the opportunity to criticize its predecessors, but even adjusting 
for this historical advantage, Regan's work is an impressive accom-
plishment. No one interested in the structure of utilitarian theories 
can afford to ignore it. 
* * * 
In the remainder of this Review I will first briefly outline Regan's 
main argument and then join some of the issues that it raises.4 His 
2. D. LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM (196S). 
3. D.H. HODGSON, CONSEQUENCES OF UTILlTARIANISM (1967). 
4. In my formulation of the argument, I have made minor alterations in some of Regan's 
definitions and theories, in the interest both of greater uniformity among them and of economy 
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objective is to compare the merits of three forms of utilitarianism. 
The most familiar of these is act-utilitarianism: 
AU An act is right if and only if it produces the 
best possible consequences in the situation in 
which it is performed. 5 
Of the various possible versions of rule-utilitarianism and utilitarian 
generalization, Regan selects (for reasons that will shortly become 
clear) what he calls the "co-ordinated optimization principle": 
COP An act is right if and only if it is prescribed 
(for the agent whose act is in question) by 
that universal prescription for action, the uni-
versal satisfaction of which would produce 
the best possible consequences. 
The third member of the trio is what Regan calls "co-operative 
utilitarianism": 
CU Each agent ought to co-operate, with whoever 
else is co-operating, in the production of the 
best possible consequences, given the behav-
ior of nonce-operators. 
The first step of the argument is a definition of what it is for a moral 
theory to be satisfied: 
Theory T is satisfied when an agent actually 
does what T requires him to do in a given sit-
uation. 
It is then possible to define two properties that a particular moral 
theory might possess: 
Theory T has PropAU if any agent satisfying 
T in any situation produces by his act the best 
possible consequences. 
Theory T has PropCOP if all agents satisfying 
T in all situations jointly produce by their 
acts the best possible consequences. 
Regan suggests that the fundamental intuitive idea underlying act-
utilitarianism is that a moral theory ought to be a good theory for 
each individual to follow (!.e., it ought to have PropAU), and that the 
fundamental intuitive idea underlying the traditional forms of rule-
utilitarianism and utilitarian generalization is that a moral theory 
of vocabulary. Any resulting distortions of his meaning are, of course, entirely my 
responsibility. 
5. In AU, and in all subsequent contexts, "best possible consequences" must be read to 
mean "consequences at least as good as would be produced by any alternative." See Regan's 
formulation of AU, p. 12. 
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ought to be a good theory for all individuals to follow (!.e., it ought to 
have PropCOP). Ideally, then, a utilitarian should want a moral the-
ory to have both properties. We thus have two standards, internal to 
utilitarianism, for judging versions of the theory. 
Regan's main substantive contentions may now be readily 
enumerated: 
(1) AU has PropAU but not PropCOP. 
(2) COP has PropCOP but not PropAU. 
(3) No form of rule-utilitarianism or utilitarian general-
ization has PropAU (and most do not even have 
PropCOP). 
(4) No form of utilitarianism that resembles AU and 
COP in being "exclusively act-oriented" can have 
both PropAU and PropCOP. 
(5) CU, which is not exclusively act-oriented, has both 
PropAU and PropCOP. 
(6) Therefore, on internal utilitarian grounds, CU is pref-
erable to AU and also to any form of rule-utilitarian-
ism or utilitarian generalization. 
For these claims to be fully intelligible we need a definition of "ex-
clusively act-oriented." I will return to this later. -
Although the main line of Regan's argument can be quickly 
sketched, a detailed description is a much more complicated matter. 
I cannot hope to do justice to more than a small part of it. I shall 
therefore pass over Regan's critique of rule-utilitarianism and utili-
tarian generalization, and focus on the relative merits of AU and 
cu. 
That AU has PropAU is obvious. That it does not have 
PropCOP is shown by the following case. Imagine two persons, Row 
and Column, each of whom is presented with two possible options: 
for Row these are rl and r2 and for Column they are cl and c2. 
They must choose between these options independently; neither is 
able to communicate with, or in any way to influence the decision 
process of, the other. Their actual choices will jointly produce an 
outcome, the values of the possible outcomes being given in the fol-
lowing matrix: 
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Let us say that an outcome is optimal when it is best (ie., at least as 
good as any other outcome). In this situation, rlcl is the optimal 
outcome. If Row and Column by their choices jointly produce that 
outcome, then each satisfies AU: given Row's rl, AU requires Col-
umn's cl, and vice versa. But if Row and Column jointly produce 
r2c2 then each still satisfies AU: given Row's r2, AU requires Col-
umn's c2, and vice versa. AU is thus universally satisfied either by 
rlcl (the optimal outcome) or by r2c2 (a suboptimal outcome); AU 
is indeterminate between these outcomes. Because universal satisfac-
tion of AU does not ensure joint production of the best conse-
quences, AU does not have PropCOP. 
In Case 1, no stipulation was made of either Row's or Column's 
reasons for choice, but we are free to imagine that they are both act-
utilitarians. Let us say that an outcome is an equilibrium when each 
agent's choice produces the best possible consequences, given the ac-
tual choice of the other; let us also say that the agents have coordi-, 
nated when they have jointly produced an equilibrium outcome. 
Act-utilitarian agents will wish to coordinate, since they will each 
have failed to satisfy AU if they jointly produce a nonequilibrium 
outcome. But universal satisfaction of AU requires only that they 
coordinate, not that they coordinate to produce the optimal outcome. 
Case 1 establishes that AU lacks PropCOP. Since this is the de-
fect in AU that leads Regan to prefer CU, it is important to ascertain 
just how serious the defect is. Regan has not shown that AU is self-
defeating. (A moral theory is self-defeating when its satisfaction im-
pairs the achievement of its own aims.)6 AU is not self-defeating for 
two reasons. First, it does not fail according to its own standards. 
PropAU captures the fundamental intuitive idea behind AU, and 
AU has PropAU. AU fails only by the standards of rule-utilitarian-
ism and utilitarian generalization. These may, of course, be stan-
dards worth meeting, and they are utilitarian standards, but they are 
not act-utilitarian standards. Second, and more important, while it 
is true that universal satisfaction of AU may produce a suboptimal 
outcome, it is not true that it must produce such an outcome. 7 The 
6. For a useful discussion of self-defeatingness in moral theories, see Parfit, Is Common-
Sense Morality Se!f-IJefeating?, 76 J. PHIL. 533 (1979). 
7. See pp. 54-65. Here lies the crucial difference between AU and some other consequen-
tialist principles. AU directs an agent to produce by his act the best overall consequences for 
everyone; it thus assigns each agent a common goal. What we might call act-egoism (AE) 
directs an agent to produce by his act the best personal consequences for himself; it thus assigns 
each agent a different goal. AU may face coordination problems in which universal satisfac-
tion of the theory is compatible with a suboptimal outcome. But AE, besides facing analogous 
problems (in situations of perfect identity of interest), may also face Prisoners' Dilemmas (in 
situations of partial conflict of interest) in which universal satisfaction of the theory ensures a 
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optimal outcome in act-utilitarian coordination problems, after all, is 
also always an equilibrium. Production by each agent individually 
of best consequences is therefore a necessary, though not a sufficient, 
condition of production by all agents collectively of best 
consequences. 
Even if AU is not self-defeating, however, the fact that a set of 
act-utilitarians may each satisfy their theory while coordinating on a 
suboptimal outcome still seems bothersome. The degree of bother 
varies in direct proportion to the size of the gap between the optimal 
and suboptimal outcomes. Consider the following matrix, for all 
values of n > 1: 
Column 
cl c2 
rl n 0 
Case 2 Row 




r1 Ion 0 
Case 3 Row 
r2 0 10-n 
The second, and especially the third case show that as the value of n 
increases it becomes correspondingly more important that act-utili-
tarians coordinate to produce the optimal outcome. 
Regan's argument does not show that they always, or indeed 
ever, fail to coordinate. This is its most important limitation. For all 
that the argument tells us, sets of act-utilitarian agents might invaria-
bly succeed, as a matter of fact, in coordinating to produce the opti-
mal outcome. The indeterminacy of AU in Cases 1-3 may easily 
mislead us: AU's indeterminacy only means that it is universally sat-
isfied by both the optimal and the suboptimal outcome; it does not 
mean that AU requires agents to be indifferent between the two out-
comes. If Row and Column in Cases 1-3 choose rlcl, they jointly 
produce better consequences than if they had chosen r2c2, but each 
also individually produces better consequences than if they had cho~ 
suboptimal outcome. There is no counterpart for AU of conflict-of-interest choice situations. 
See Parfit, supra note 6. 
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sen r2c2.8 Since AU enjoins them to produce the best consequences, 
each, therefore, has an AU-given reason for preferring that they co-
ordinate to produce the optimum. Neither, of course, can bring 
about this result unilaterally, but each has a reason for doing what 
he can to help bring it about. This fact explains why we should find 
it inexplicable, indeed perverse, if the two act-utilitarians in Cases 1-
3 were to coordinate on the suboptimal outcome.9 If coordinating to 
produce the optimal outcome were just as easy as producing the 
suboptimal outcome, what reason could either have for unilaterally 
defeating that result? 
In coordination problems, one equilibrium result may possess 
some property that makes it stand out from the others; it may, that is, 
be salient. 10 It then becomes an obvious point on which agents who 
wish to coordinate may converge. In the first three Cases, rlcl stands 
out simply because it is optimal. This fact provides act-utilitarians 
with an AU-given reason for trying to coordinate to produce that 
outcome. They have available to them a strategy which, if univer-
sally followed, will ensure such coordination. Consider Case 1 
again. Row's r1 will yield (depending on Column's choice) either 10 
or 0; call this his 10-0 option. His r2 will yield either 0 or 6; call this 
his 0-6 option. Column also faces 10-0 and 0-6 options. Row and 
Column are thus symmetrically situated. 11 Neither option is (even 
weakly) dominant; however, they do have different maxima. If Row 
and Column both choose the option with the higher maximum (if 
both "maximax") they will coordinate to produce the optimum. And 
they will do so in all act-utilitarian coordination problems where 
there is a unique optimal result. Nothing, incidentally, depends on 
the fact that Row and Column are symmetrically situated in the first 










8. I use here the marginal conception of consequences (correctly) favored by Regan, pp. 
13-17. 
9. It is also what lies behind the obviousness argument that Regan dismisses. See pp. 21-
23. 
IO. I have borrowed this term from Gauthier, Coordination, 14 DIALOGUE 195 (1975). The 
classic discussion is T. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960). 
11. By saying that Row and Column are symmetrically situated I mean that the possible 
(individual) consequences of their options are identical. Regan uses a different notion of sym-
metry. See pp. 23-25. 
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Here Row faces 10-5 and 0-6 options while Column faces 10-0 and 
5-6 options. Nonetheless, if both maximax they will coordinate to 
produce the optimal result, rlcl. 
Maximax is, therefore, a rule or procedure for choosing among 
options that will naturally suggest itself for universal adoption by 
act-utilitarians in coordination problems. What is its status relative 
to AU itself? We should remember that satisfying AU generally re-
quires considerable information about the choice situation. AU is 
difficult to satisfy when that information is, for whatever reason, in-
complete. Consider cases of "individual choice under uncertainty." 
Here, the outcome is determined partly by the individual's choice 
and partly, not by the independent choice of another agent, but by 
nature. Further, the agent lacks sufficient information even to assign 
objective probabilities to the various possible states of nature. Imag-
ine that Row is told that an um contains 100 balls, some red and 
some black, but is not told the ratio of one to the other. One ball is 
to be drawn at random from the um and Row is required to choose 
between betting on red or black, with the following payoffs: 









Asssuming that Row wishes to produce the best consequences, how 
is he to choose? Given that he is confronted by 10-0 and 0-6 options, 
it seems reasonable for him to maximax, and thus to bet red. Max-
imax is a strategy or procedure intended to increase the likelihood of 
satisfying AU in a situation whose incomplete description makes it 
impossible to satisfy AU directly. Whether the strategy is best in a 
particular case will be determined by the way things actually tum 
out (whether AU is satisfied). Whether it is best in all cases of this 
sort will be determined by the way things actually tum out in the 
long run (how often AU is satisfied). AU thus remains the final test 
of the value of the strategy. In Case 5, maximax seems to be a sensi-
ble act-utilitarian strategy. This is, however, not always so in situa-















Here maximax still dictates betting red, but betting black seems the 
wiser choice. Agents in situations of "individual choice under uncer-
tainty" who are attempting to satisfy AU will have to attend to both 
the maxima and the minima of their options. 
Whereas maximax is a fallible strategy for an individual act-utili-
tarian in choice under uncertainty, it is an infallible strategy for a 
group of act-utilitarians in coordination problems with a unique op-
timum. This very fact renders it salient for the members of such a 
group and thus incr~ases the likelihood that they will all follow it 
and so will all coordinate to produce the optimal result. 
An outcome may be salient for reasons other than its being an 
optimum. The bare schemata of coordination problems largely sup-
press the further properties that can make outcomes salient. In real-
life problems, however, some of these additional cues are likely to be 
available to agents who are trying to coordinate. To the extent that 
they are available in a given case, act-utilitarians again increase their 
chances of successful coordination. 
These further salient properties become particularly important 
when we discard a feature that has been shared by all cases thus far 










With no further cues, Row and Column have no reason for prefer-
ring rlcl over r2c2; maximax does not determine a unique choice. 
Row and Column are therefore in danger of failing to coordinate on 
either equilibrium, and thus of failing to satisfy AU. Each has an 
AU-given reason for trying to coordinate, but no reason for aiming 
at a particular equilibrium outcome. If they are presented only with 
the abstract schema and are still prevented from communicating, 
they may have to resort to a randomized strategy that depends for its 
success upon luck. In cases with multiple optima, AU remains inde-
terminate in outcome since it is universally satisfied by any equilib-
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rium, including a suboptimal one. But it is also indeterminate in 
strategy: because there is no unique optimum, there is also no salient 
choice procedure on which to converge. In real-life coordination 
problems with multiple optima, act-utilitarians who are unable to 
communicate will need to rely on further cues to render one of the 
optima salient.12 
If, unlike Row and Column, they are able to communicate, they 
will have additional resources for ensuring coordination. In the first 
four Cases they should agree to maxim.ax, and in Case 7 they should 
agree to choose one of the two equally attractive optima. Thus 
again, once the artificial constraints of the abstract problem are dis-
carded, the chances improve that act-utilitarians will in fact manage 
to produce an optimal outcome.13 
In some real-life coordination problems, communication and 
agreement are admittedly either impossible or excessively costly -
whether because of the number of agents involved, or their spatial or 
temporal distance from one another, or whatever. In such cases, a 
further device is available to produce coordination: the establish-
ment and enforcement of a rule. Navigation is an obvious example. 
Perhaps in each separate instance ships approaching one another 
would manage to agree to pass either to port or to starboard, but it is 
more efficient to select one or the other (perhaps arbitrarily), enforce 
it as a general rule, and punish violators. Society exists, in part at 
least, to solve coordination problems. Sanctions alter the conse-
quences of the choices confronting the agents. In Case 7, for in-
stance, enforcing a rule requiring Row's rl and Column's cl -
agents choosing other options would be punished - would reduce 
the value of r2c2, thus converting Case 7 into something more like 
Case 1. And, of course, the fact that a given action is legally ( or 
socially) required may itself render the action salient, even apart 
from its effect on the value of its consequences. 
12. Regan's cooperative utilitarians must also resort to such cues in choice situations of this 
sort. See pp. 190-206. 
13. Regan's discussion of communication and agreement among act-utilitarian agents, pp. 
32-43, is the least convincing in the book. The issue is not how act-utilitarians develop prac-
tices such as language use or agreement keeping, but whether act-utilitarians who have such 
practices can use them to coordinate. The very existence of the practices renders cenain proce-
dures (such as agreeing to maximax and then keeping the agreement) salient; therefore, they 
increase the likelihood of optimal coordination (which is what act-utilitarians will be trying to 
achieve). Regan recognizes all this when he summarizes his objection: "[A]ll I claim is that it 
does not follow from the fact that certain parties are act-utilitarians that an 'agreement' be-
tween them will have any effect on their expectations or behaviour. Whether an agreement is 
effective or not depends on facts about the parties other than the fact that they are act-utilitari-
ans." P. 37. These further facts include their ability to speak a common language and to make 
and keep agreements, properties generally possessed by real-life act-utilitarians. 
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Because AU does not have PropCOP, universal satisfaction of 
AU does not ensure coordination on an optimum. But universal sat-
isfaction of AU is always compatible with coordination on some op-
timum, and act-utilitarians have an AU-given reason for wishing so 
to coordinate. Act-utilitarians, moreover, have a variety of proce-
dures, strategies, and devices - salience, communication, agree-
ment, enforcement - available for increasing the likelihood of 
effective coordination. AU's lack of PropCOP may, therefore, be a 
theoretical defect with few practical costs. It will not much matter in 
practice that universal satisfaction of AU does not ensure an optimal 
outcome if universal satisfaction of AU in fact generally results in an 
optimal outcome. 
Still, the fact remains that universal satisfaction of Regan's CU 
does ensure production of an optimum. Is not a theory whose cor-
rect application by all guarantees an optimum superior, in practical 
terms, to one whose correct application by all might produce a 
suboptimum? Not necessarily. We need to distinguish two sorts of 
consequences that may flow from a theory's universal satisfaction. 
The first are the consequences of the acts that the theory requires: 
call these the theory's direct consequences. The second are other 
consequences of the procedure that the theory employs to yield its 
conclusions: call these its indirect consequences. Unless act-utilitari-
ans manage invariably to coordinate to produce an optimum, uni-
versal satisfaction of CU has better direct consequences than 
universal satisfaction of AU. But satisfaction of CU may not have 
better indirect consequences. 
AU is exclusively act-oriented. This means that it provides 
agents with a criterion for choosing among the acts open to them, but 
it does not require the use of any particular procedure in making 
that choice. CU is not exclusively act-oriented. It dictates a decision-
making procedure; the right act is simply the one selected by that 
procedure. One of the indirect consequences of a theory is the ex-
penditure of time and energy needed to apply it. No theory is 
costless in application, but complex and difficult decision-making 
procedures are more costly than simple and easy ones. The proce-
dure required by CU is complex and difficult. AU is more flexible in 
allowing agents to resort to a variety of procedures and devices in 
response to the exigencies of actual situations. AU has direct costs 
since its universal satisfaction does not ensure the production of an 
optimum; CU has indirect costs since its procedure consumes time 
and energy. The direct advantages of CU must, therefore, be bal-
anced against the indirect advantages of AU. How this balance will 
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tum out is an empirical question, which will depend upon the fre-
quency with which groups of act-utilitarians achieve optimal coordi-
nation, the extent of the losses (the gap between optimum and 
suboptimum) on the occasions when they fail, the costs of the devices 
available to act-utilitarians, and the costs of the procedure required 
by CU. It is far from clear that the balance will, all things consid-
ered, favor CU. CU, in other words, may have no utilitarian advan-
tage over AU. 
The traditional strength of AU has been its flexibility. While it 
provides an objective measure for the moral value of actions, it al-
lows agents who are attempting to satisfy it to use a wide variety of 
decision-making procedures that could enable them to overcome a 
number of common liabilities: their own fallibility, their tendency 
toward partiality, and their limited knowledge of the circumstances 
that will affect the consequences of their acts. AU provides a stan-
dard for evaluating all of these procedures: the best set of proce-
dures, adapted to different circumstances, is the set that best satisfies 
AU over the long run. CU provides one such procedure, among 
others, for use in coordination problems. Where its direct benefits 
outweigh its indirect costs act-utilitarians have a reason for employ-
ing it; where its costs outweigh its benefits, they have no such reason. 
When both direct and indirect consequences are taken into account, 
CU takes its place as another strategy available to act-utilitarians 
who are attempting to apply their theory in an imperfect world. 
* * * 
A version of utilitarianism ought to be adequate by utilitarian 
standards. Regan has made a significant contribution to the internal 
evaluation of forms of utilitarianism by distinguishing clearly be-
tween their adequacy on the individual and collective levels, and by 
exposing the theoretical deficiency of AU on the latter level. The 
proper conclusions to be drawn concerning the relative merits of AU 
and CU are, however, more indeterminate than Regan would wish. 
If we confine ourselves to the direct consequences of theories, then 
the utilitarian costs of AU's lack of PropCOP will depend on the 
extent to which act-utilitarians manage in real-life situations to coor-
dinate to produce an optimum. And when we expand attention, as 
utilitarians must, to all of the consequences of theories, direct and 
indirect, then it is far from obvious that CU is superior to AU on 
either the individual or collective level. 
I would not wish to leave the impression that the criticisms I have 
made of Regan's central argument are novel. Indeed, most of them 
are anticipated and dealt with in the text, though I believe that they 
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have greater force than Regan has been prepared to concede. Be 
that as it may, the true measure of the value of this book will lie in 
the quality of the controversy that it seems likely to inspire. 
